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Introduction 
 It is in some ways surprising to include the early Confucian philosopher Mengzi 
(Mencius) [372-289 BCE] in a volume devoted to neglected voices in metaethics, and in other 
ways, not surprising at all. It is surprising in that in contemporary east Asian cultures and 
philosophy, Mengzi is not neglected. He is one of the most prominent and influential 
philosophers in east Asia, and in terms of relative impact both on philosophical traditions and on 
public life, he has been one of the most influential philosophers in history. It is not surprising to 
include Mengzi in this volume, however, for at least two reasons. First, despite being one of the 
most influential philosophers in history, Mengzi is largely ignored in contemporary Anglo-
American moral philosophy. Second, Mengzi himself seemed less interested in questions we 
might think of as metaethical and much more interested in theoretical questions at the 
intersection of moral psychology and normative ethics, as well as in practical and normative 
questions about moral development, virtue, political legitimacy, and good governance.  
 But, despite his limited interest in metaethical issues, we will argue here that there are 
several valuable insights for contemporary metaethics that we can draw from Mengzi’s work – 
especially concerning moral change, discovery, and progress.1 There seem to have been genuine 
																																								 																				
1 Mengzi represents what some would call the intuitionist wing of Confucianism and may be largely responsible for 
the impression that Confucianism and even the whole of Chinese philosophy relies heavily on intuitions. Even 
though Mengzi did not directly engage in what we would call metaethical inquiries, his normative and naturalistic 
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instances of progressive moral change, which we will call “moral progress” (e.g., a person in the 
mid-19th century coming to believe that slavery is wrong, or that it is impermissible to limit 
educational opportunities by gender). This progress could be understood as agents acquiring 
knowledge of objective, mind-independent moral facts (realism) or as agents merely somehow 
improving their morally-relevant beliefs or desires (constructivism and some other forms of anti-
realism). Insofar as any metaethical view is committed to the possibility of moral progress, 
however, that view owes us an explanation of how this progress can occur (Kitcher 2011; 
Campbell and Kumar 2012, 2013; Kurth 2017; Arruda 2017).  
The issue we address in this paper is how Mengzian ethics could help anti-realists better 
explain moral progress. A growing number of philosophers have defended anti-realist accounts 
of moral progress, according to which moral progress amounts to developing processes, systems, 
and attitudes in which our moral values are applied more broadly, consistently, or successfully 
rather than, as moral realists believe, uncovering mind-independent objective moral truths.2 
Somewhat surprisingly, proponents of these accounts argue that they have several advantages 
over realist accounts of moral progress. Most obviously, in rejecting or ignoring the existence of 
objective moral facts, they are ontologically more parsimonious. But they may also provide 
																																								 																				
framework provided a foundation that blossomed into rich metaphysical discussion in Neo-Confucian philosophy 
throughout east Asia between the 11th and 16th centuries.  
    
2 For example, moral progress might consist in developing moral systems that better fulfill the original, cooperative 
function of morality (Kitcher 2011) or, more importantly for our purposes, in reasoning our way to a more consistent 
application of our antecedently-held moral values and principles (Campbell and Kumar 2013, 2012). There is not 
universal agreement about how we should delineate moral realism and anti-realism. For example, Copp (2007) treats 
any theory according to which there are moral truths as realist, whether they are objective in a strong mind-
independent sense or not. Here, we restrict moral realism to what we might think of as “strong” moral realism, 
according to which moral truths are a mind-independent feature of the universe.  
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better explanations of moral progress than realist views. This paper does just that – we argue that 
Mengzian ethics can help us build better accounts of moral progress than realist accounts. 
 More specifically, we’ll offer one general lesson and two smaller, particular lessons for 
moral anti-realists looking to provide explanations of moral progress (though they aren’t limited 
in interest to anti-realists). Our goal is not to develop and argue for a single complete Mengzian 
account of all relevant forms of moral progress, but instead to show how extant accounts of 
moral progress can be helpfully supplemented by some key ideas in Mengzi’s ethical system.3 
We also want to showcase some especially nice features of what a broadly Mengzian account of 
moral progress might have. The first, more general lesson is that accounts of personal moral 
progress should focus on improving and shifting perspectives over and above mere changes in 
beliefs. We will say more about perspective shifting in Section 3, but suffice it to say for now 
that in addition to containing beliefs, perspectives also structure them according to salience and 
centrality, and beyond beliefs, perspectives include patterns of perception, interpretation and 
inference, attitudes, emotions, and associations (Camp 2006, 2013; Riggs 2016; Elgin 2002, 
2010). Mengzian theories of moral psychology and moral development are especially well-suited 
to provide useful insights on eliciting and facilitating changes of perspectives that amount to 
moral progress. The second and third lessons concern Mengzian applications of the first lesson 
																																								 																				
3 Readers may at this point wonder how Mengzi (or a Mengzian-inspired constructivist) would, in general, 
distinguish between moral progress and mere moral change. Providing a full answer to this question that adequately 
respects both the richness of the original text and of the panoply of historical and contemporary scholarly 
interpretations of it would require far more space than we have here, so, instead, we’ll provide a bare sketch of an 
answer here. For Mengzi, moral changes in line with the dao (the Way 道) are instances of moral progress. We can 
come to know the dao via the moral sensibilities of our heart-mind (xin心). These moral sensibilities are naturally 
oriented in the right direction, in that we have in us the inclination and potential (including the emotions and 
intellectual abilities) to become moral. Our natural moral sensibilities can be cultivated and enriched in various ways 
including focusing one’s attention on these moral sensibilities and the mindful practice of ritual (li 禮) invented by 
the ancient sage-kings. A fully-enriched and cultivated heart-mind can appreciate the dao and thus is able to identify 
moral improvements. 
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and are drawn from case studies of two key passages in Mengzi: (1A7 and 3A5 respectively).4 
The second lesson is that analogical reasoning, namely using pre-cognitive associations between 
similar matters/situations, facilitates changes in one’s perspectives and thus enables moral 
progress. The third lesson is that anti-realist accounts of moral progress can be helpfully 
supplemented by exploring how emotions that become prominent in certain situations can lead to 
moral progress.  Mengzi’s text provides several useful examples of this. We should emphasize 
here, at the outset, that we are not claiming that Mengzi should be interpreted as an anti-realist or 
a constructivist, but instead that aspects of his moral theory can be utilized by moral anti-realists 
and constructivists to improve their accounts of moral progress. 
1. Moral progress 
 Intuitively, there are instances of moral progress. Moral progress can happen in our 
personal lives – when we come to realize that something we didn’t think of as immoral actually 
was, or that something we thought of as immoral really wasn’t. It can also happen in society at 
large – think of the shifts in moral opinions after the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin or the 
media coverage of the Selma marches. Both moral realist and non-skeptical anti-realist 
metaethical theories should explain both what that progressive moral change amounts to and how 
it can happen. Moral realist theories, according to which there are objective moral facts, can 
perhaps provide the most straightforward account of such progress: moral progress works like 
epistemic progress in other objective domains of inquiry. Progressive moral change happens 
when people learn or discover new objective moral facts. Yet, in a fascinating recent 
development in metaethics, several philosophers have argued that some anti-realist theories can 
																																								 																				
4 The volume of dialogues accredited to Mengzi is titled Mencius or Mengzi. We use italic to refer to the book. The 
volume has 7 sections that are named Book 1 through Book 7. Each section contains parts A and B. For example, 
Mengzi 1A7 refers to Book 1 of Mengzi, section A, passage 7. 
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explain moral progress as adequately or even better than realist theories can (Kitcher 2011, 2012; 
Campbell and Kumar 2013; Kurth 2017; see Arruda 2017). These arguments typically function 
by examining paradigmatic cases of moral progress and finding that straightforward realist 
explanations seem to capture the moral change in question very poorly. As Richard Campbell 
and Victor Kumar (2013) gloss Philip Kitcher’s (2011) version of the argument: 
Moral innovators who push towards progressive moral change…do not enter into 
psychological processes that give any indication that they are responding to mind-
independent moral facts that would make the changes objectively progressive on the 
supposed conception of objectivity. Indeed, if we suppose the reformers to be sincere, 
they view the reasons for moral change in ways that are entirely mind-dependent. 
(Campbell and Kumar 2013, 447) 
Thus, error theorists and fictionalists such as J.L. Mackie (1991) or Richard Joyce (2007), 
pragmatic naturalists such as Kitcher (2011) or Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and David 
Wong (2016) and constructivists such as Sharon Street (2006) have developed broadly anti-
realist accounts that might better capture what really happens in cases of moral progress. In this 
chapter, we will be most interested in anti-realist constructivist accounts of moral progress. 
Street (2006, 2010) has described metaethical constructivism as claiming that “the truth of a 
normative claim consists in the claim’s being entailed from within the practical point of view” 
(Street 2010, 367) and “the subject matter of ethics is the subject matter of what follows from 
within the standpoint of creatures who are already taking this, that, or the other thing to be 
valuable” (Street 2006, 367). Caroline Arruda provides a helpful “ecumenical” description of 
metaethical constructivism as “the view that morality is underwritten by the practical attitudes of 
agents” and constructivist moral progress as “changes in the way that an agent relates to those 
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attitudes that do the work of underwriting moral claims” (Arruda 2017, 18).  In short, for 
constructivists, the justification of moral claims does not come from their correspondence with 
mind-independent objective facts but from their relation to the moral perspectives, attitudes, and 
values of actual or counterfactual agents. Thus, moral progress does not consist in learning new 
objective facts but instead in bringing our moral beliefs into better alignment with relevant actual 
or counterfactual perspectives, attitudes, and values.  
2. Lesson One: Progress in Perspective 
The first lesson is that moral progress involves shifting between and improving perspectives, 
and should not be limited to changing moral beliefs. In this section, we will first discuss what a 
perspective is in this context, and with help from Mengzi, we will begin to make the case why 
understanding moral progress in terms of changing of perspectives has advantages over focusing 
only on the changing of beliefs.  
Standard characterizations of constructivism (Street 2010; Arruda 2017) explicitly refer to 
standpoints or perspectives, but a standpoint or perspective is not just a set of beliefs. Elisabeth 
Camp, who argues that perspectives cannot be reduced to sets of propositions (Camp 2006), 
treats perspectives as “ongoing dispositions to structure one’s thoughts,” including dispositions 
“to notice and remember certain types of features rather than others” and “to treat some classes 
of features as more [causally, motivationally, or explanatorily] central” (Camp 2013, 336). 
Intuitively, perspectives include patterns of association and inference and they can be shaped not 
only by our beliefs but also by values, emotions, attitudes, basic evaluative tendencies, and 
moods. This raises the tantalizing possibility of accounting for moral progress in terms of 
improved perspectives rather than merely in terms of improved beliefs. Insofar as a perspectival 
model of our minds is more psychologically accurate than a purely-propositional model, and 
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insofar as some moral perspectives intuitively are better than others, we have good reasons to 
pursue a perspectival account of moral progress. Importantly, moral progress on such an account 
could occur not only from small improvements in individual components of perspectives (such 
as in one’s moral beliefs) but also in wholesale perspective shifts. Consider Catherine Elgin’s 
discussion of how perspectival models of the mind are generally epistemically superior to belief-
oriented models: 
Human beings [we might think] seem to gather information in the way that squirrels 
gather nuts. Bit by bit, we amass data and store it away against future need. Many 
epistemologists and laymen take cognitive progress to consist in data gathering…[but] 
this conception of cognitive progress both constricts and distorts the subject…it cannot 
even make sense of a variety of cognitive innovations that figure in the advancement of 
science. (Elgin 2002, 1–2) 
Though Elgin here is interested in general epistemic progress and epistemic progress in science, 
the point applies to morality as well. In fact, there is an even stronger case for perspectival 
models of progress in moral domains, since our moral concerns are not limited to our moral 
beliefs. Moral progress solely in terms of changes in moral beliefs without concomitant changes 
in our emotions and emotional dispositions, and patterns of association, interpretation, or 
perception would be quite limited. Mengzi certainly seemed to think so: in the two passages 
we’ll examine below (1A7 and 3A5), his strategy can be seen as attempts to shift his 
interlocuters’ moral perspectives.5 In particular, Mengzi utilizes patterns of emotive association 
																																								 																				
5 We need to be careful here with our interpretive methodology. It would be obviously implausible to claim that 
Mengzi’s picture of human psychology cleanly maps on to contemporary philosophical views. Instead, our claim is 
that Mengzi’s working model of our moral minds is complex and rich in many of the ways that contemporary 
perspectival models are.  
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and interpretation to prepare his interlocutors for the appropriate perspective shift. As we’ll see, 
in 1A7 Mengzi prepares King Xuan for a perspective shift concerning his obligations to his 
citizens by reminding the king of an emotionally-laden decision he made to spare a sacrificial ox, 
and in 3A5 Mengzi prepares his interlocutor Yi Zhi for a perspective shift concerning moral 
theories by reminding Yi Zhi of an emotionally-laden decision to provide a lavish funeral for his 
parents.  
In light of recent scholarship on Mengzi, it is clear that Mengzi takes our moral minds to 
include more than sets of beliefs and rational inferences. Mengzi employs a famous botanical 
metaphor to illustrate his view of the goodness of human nature. He claims that all human beings 
possess four sprouts (or beginnings): the sprout of ceyin (a compassion-like emotion 惻隱), 
xiuwu (a shame-like reaction or emotion羞惡 ), cirang (a sense of deference	辭讓), and shifei (a 
sense of right and wrong 是非). These four beginnings, on Mengzi’s account, have the potential 
to mature into his four cardinal virtues: ren (benevolence, humaneness仁), yi (righteousness義), 
li (propriety, observance of rites禮), and zhi (wisdom智). The four moral beginnings are 
multifaceted mental processes that include cognitive, affective and motivational aspects (Van 
Norden 1991; Flanagan 2014; Wong 2015), that are governed by one’s heart/mind (xin心 ), an 
organ that is simultaneously cognitive and volitional. This psychological framework helps us see 
that propositional beliefs and rational inference are, according to Mengzi, merely one part of 
moral deliberation. Mengzian moral deliberation also includes (and even focuses on) one’s 
affective and motivational responses. For example, when highlighting the altruistic nature of 
human beings, one of Mengzi’s key arguments is based on people’s immediate natural affective 
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and motivational response to a child falling into danger (1A7), as opposed to people’s general, 
abstract moral principles and reasoning. In contemporary scholarship, excellent work has been 
done on the rich terrains of the Mengzian moral mind, especially work on moral sensitivity and 
connoisseurship (Hutton 2002; Ivanhoe 2011), on Mengzi’s theory of moral development 
(Flanagan 2014; McRae 2011; Wong 2015; Shun 1997), on the psychological mechanisms by 
which Confucian ritual is taken to promote moral growth (Sarkissian 2010; Slingerland 2011), 
and on Mengzi’s views in light of dual process theories of moral judgment or moral foundations 
theory (Kim 2016; Luo 2015). Clearly, Mengzi is concerned with moral epistemic improvement 
across a much wider variety of dimensions than moral belief. This is why reading Mengzi is 
tremendously helpful for thinking about moral progress in terms of perspective: in doing so, we 
do not restrict ourselves to focusing exclusively on abstract rational inferences and beliefs. For 
Mengzi, legitimate moral progress can be initiated by changes in non-abstract mental states: by 
visceral bodily and emotional reactions, or by seeing one thing as another (e.g. seeing an ox 
being led to sacrifice as an innocent prisoner being led to execution). 
This is not to say that Mengzi (or a Mengzian-inspired account of moral progress) is 
unconcerned with improving our moral beliefs. If this were the case, there would be an obvious 
objection: improvements in our moral beliefs are part of moral progress. We claim that Mengzi 
is especially helpful for anti-realist and constructivist accounts of moral progress because his 
accounts of moral development and moral psychology show how legitimate moral progress can 
both occur in and be prompted by changes in our non-propositional mental states, structures, and 
processes. Justified improvements in our moral beliefs might ride on the coattails of changes and 
improvements in the rest of our moral perspectives.   
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According to Mengzi, moral development happens primarily by developing and “extending” 
one’s basic moral capacities or dispositions: the four sprouts / beginnings. We have these 
beginnings as part of our human nature, and moral development consists in cultivating them 
through a variety of means. However, many types of moral development are not particularly 
relevant to the debate between realists and anti-realists about the best accounts of moral progress. 
One site of disagreement in that debate concerns cases that realists accounts of moral progress 
seem to explain especially well: cases in which a person’s moral beliefs change from being 
apparently incorrect to apparently correct. Thus, we’ll focus here on two famous passages in 
Mengzi that do fit this mold. In these passages, Mengzi seems to be applying his theory of moral 
development to cases of changes in moral belief or perspective. In the first (1A7), Mengzi 
attempts to elicit a change in King Xuan’s moral perspectives concerning his citizens, and in the 
second (3A5), Mengzi describes people coming to believe that they were obligated to bury their 
parents. 
3. Lesson Two: Analogical Reasoning 
Campbell and Kumar (2012, 2013) develop one anti-realist account of moral progress: 
consistency-based reasoning, which takes as a paradigm case the reasoning implicit in Peter 
Singer’s famous famine relief argument (Singer 1973). Their basic idea is that we can convince 
someone to change her moral belief from “Φ is not wrong” to “Φ is wrong” by pointing to an 
action that is similar in all morally relevant respects and which that person already thinks is 
wrong. Refusing to save a drowning child because doing so would cause one’s suit to get wet, so 
the argument goes, has no morally relevant differences from refusing to donate to famine relief. 
Such consistency-based reasoning is a familiar form of ethical argument. Campbell and Kumar 
point out, however, that, since people tend to be motivated to be morally consistent, and not for 
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purely epistemic motives (e.g., for social motives such as not wanting to be seen as a hypocrite), 
consistency-based reasoning can produce progressive moral change. We see this when we look at 
other paradigmatic cases of progressive moral change such as the abolition of slavery and the 
expansion of civil rights to women: certain people applied their moral principles inconsistently to 
different groups of people, realized this, and then adjusted their moral beliefs. And thus, 
according to Campbell and Kumar, we can account for many paradigm cases of moral progress 
without appeal to the new discovery of any fully mind-independent moral facts. 
In short, the idea is that we can spot an inconsistency in someone’s overall moral beliefs 
and convince that person to make amendments accordingly. In this section, we argue that what 
appears to be consistency-based reasoning induced moral progress may sometimes in fact be a 
result of other methods, such as analogical reasoning (which we will introduce shortly). 
Understanding alternative forms of moral reasoning can help enrich anti-realist accounts of 
moral progress. We can see this by considering the case of “the king and the ox” (1A7), one of 
the most frequently discussed passages in Mengzi. At first glance, readers might think that in this 
passage Mengzi is appealing to consistency-reasoning. However, on a closer reading, we can see 
that there are equally plausible alternatives explanations of Mengzi’s strategy for inducing 
progressive moral change: 
Mengzi said, “I heard your attendant Hu He say, 
While the king was sitting up in his hall, an ox was led past below. The king saw it 
and said, ‘Where is the ox going?’ 
Hu He replied, ‘We are about to ritually anoint a bell with its blood.’ The king said, 
‘Spare it. I cannot bear its frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the 
execution ground.’ 
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Hu He replied, ‘So should we dispense with the anointing of the bell?’ The king 
said, ‘How can that be dispensed with? Exchange it for a sheep.’” 
Mengzi continued, “I do not know if this happened.” 
The king said, “It happened.” 
Mengzi said, “This heart is sufficient to become King. The commoners all thought 
Your Majesty was being stingy. But I knew that Your Majesty simply could not 
bear the suffering of the ox.” 
The king said, “That is so. There were indeed commoners who said that. But 
although Qi is a small state, how could I be stingy about one ox? It was just that I 
could not bear its frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the execution 
ground. Hence, I exchanged it for a sheep.” 
Mengzi said, “Let Your Majesty not be surprised at the commoners taking you to be 
stingy. You took a small thing and exchanged it for a big thing. How could they 
understand it? If Your Majesty was pained at its being innocent and going to the 
execution ground, then what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?” 
The King laughed, saying, “What was this feeling really? It’s not the case that I 
grudged its value and exchanged it for a sheep. But it makes sense that the 
commoners would say I was stingy.” 
Mengzi said, “There is no harm.  This is just the way benevolence works. You saw 
the ox but had not seen the sheep. As for the relation of gentlemen to birds and 
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beasts, if they see them living, they cannot bear to see them die. If they hear their 
cries, they cannot bear to eat their flesh. (Mengzi 1A7)6 
In this passage, King Xuan remembers ordering a sacrificial ox to be spared because its 
(apparently) frightened expression reminded him of an innocent person going to the execution 
ground. Mengzi praises King Xuan for this moment of compassion, but then presses the king to 
see his people as proper objects of compassion too. Shortly thereafter (1A7.10), when the king 
responds that he is unable to do, Mengzi scoffs that this response is like being able to lift 500 
pounds while claiming that one could not lift a feather; the King was clearly able to feel 
compassion and be benevolent towards his subjects. 
There have been many interpretations of this passage. Many readers naturally interpret 
Mengzi’s strategy here as a straightforward example of consistency-based reasoning: if the king 
feels compassion for the ox, the king should also feel compassion for his subjects. Thus, 
Mengzi’s strategy, on this view, is to elicit moral change in King Xuan by showing him that he 
has inconsistent beliefs concerning who and what the King should show compassion towards. 
Kwong-loi Shun (1991) has defended just such an interpretation. But while Mengzi’s intention 
here is not explicitly documented in the text, some scholars interpret Mengzi’s strategy as instead 
using “analogical reasoning” coupled with the “method of extension.” Some interpreters (Van 
Norden 1991; Ihara 1991; Wong 2002; Hu 2018; Ing 1999) have provided or come close to 
providing what David Wong calls “emotive” interpretations of Mengzi’s strategy, whereby 
Mengzi is trying to extend the king’s antecedent compassion (including the cognitive, affective 
and motivational aspects of the emotional response) so that he is “impressed with sufficient force 
																																								 																				
6 This English translation is based on the original text of Mencius 1A7 in Yang 1962 and the English translation of 
Van Norden 2008: 8-10. All cited translations and original texts of the book of Mencius (or Mengzi) in this paper are 
from the abovementioned sources. 
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and vividness” by his moral emotions applied in new situations and to new targets (Wong 2002, 
191). This happens through making the king recall what it was like when he felt compassion 
towards an object he spared and growing from there. The ox’s frightened expression, as King 
Xuan recalls, reminded him of an innocent person going to the execution grounds. In recalling 
this memory, Mengzi is also priming Xuan to recall the feeling of compassion and the motivation 
for acting on it: for Mengzi these are all psychologically bound together. Instead of appealing 
solely to consistency (which has trouble accounting for why Mengzi ignores the sheep that was 
sacrificed in the ox’s stead), Mengzi focuses on the king’s association between the ox’s fear and 
an innocent person’s fear towards death. He tries to extend this association to additional innocent 
but suffering objects; the king’s own citizens.7 As Wong explains: 
In 1A7, there are two associations between two pairs of cases. Each comparison involves 
not only a comparison of the cases but of the agent’s reactions to the cases. Within the 
first pair, the King likens the eyes of the innocent man to the eyes of the ox, likens the 
compassion he feels for the innocent man to his feeling for the ox. Within the second 
pair, Mengzi urges him to compare the plight of the ox to that of his people and to 
compare his compassionate reaction to the ox to what ought to be the compassion he feels 
for his people. In both pairs, reflection on the two cases involves the perception of 
relevant similarity (Wong 2002, 197, emphasis added). 
Thus, analogical reasoning does not consist in realizing that one is applying some moral 
principle or commitment inconsistently. Emily McRae explains, “the moral agent judges one 
																																								 																				
7 We should emphasize that Wong does not support this purely emotive interpretation as the sole explanation of 
Mengzi’s strategy: “On the one hand, we cannot interpret Mengzi as holding that appropriate and motivationally 
effective moral feeling can be generated purely by appeal to logical consistency; but on the other hand, we cannot 
attribute to him the view that innate moral feelings are fully developed and already contain all the action-guiding 
content they need to have” (2002, 191). Thus, Wong suggests that Mengzi is not only trying to redirect King Xuan’s 
moral emotions, but also trying to develop, refine and improve them, and further that this process cannot work by 
consistency-based reasoning alone: Wong calls this a “developmental” interpretation. 
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case to be relevantly analogous to another prior to formulating an abstract principle stating that 
relevant characteristic” (McRae 2011, 592-593, emphasis added). The implications for an anti-
realist account of moral progress are straightforward - we can simply adjust Campbell and 
Kumar’s account. Recall that on their account, sometimes moral progress occurs because a 
person realizes they are applying their antecedently-held moral beliefs, principles, or values 
inconsistently. On the present account, people immediately come to see certain cases as being 
morally alike. This illustrates a further difference between (and advantage of) analogical 
reasoning: consistency-based reasoning requires one to have an articulated general moral belief 
or principle with which to compare to antecedently-held moral beliefs and principles. However, 
we do not always have such fully-articulated general moral beliefs and principles: sometimes 
our moral opinions are more inchoate and nebulous. Moreover, analogical reasoning is capable 
of generating perspective shifts even in cases of consistent but misguided systems of moral 
beliefs. In such cases, it elicits changes in patterns of interpretation and association that can 
then change beliefs or principles. For example, King Xuan may have previously held a 
consistent view according to which being compassionate to his people will not help his political 
agenda, and this view may be more vulnerable to analogical challenges than to consistency-
based ones. 
   For us, analogical reasoning is especially interesting for developing an account of moral 
progress in terms of improving moral perspectives rather than merely improving our moral 
beliefs.  Analogical reasoning is better suited to describing the change of perspectives: to come 
to see and feel one thing as another thing. Further, since patterns of association and 
interpretation are key components of perspectives, analogical reasoning can directly work on 
greater portions of our perspectives than consistency-based reasoning alone. This means that 
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analogical reasoning can often be more effective in generating large perspective shifts. Further, 
a better understanding of analogical reasoning can explain why certain ethical arguments works 
better than other arguments, since their employment of emotionally-laden language helps 
facilitate analogical reasoning. Examples of analogical reasoning can be found in well-known 
and powerful ethical arguments in contemporary ethics.  Let’s consider just one - Peter Singer’s 
famous case of Bob’s Bugatti (based on a case developed by Peter Unger): 
Bob is close to retirement. He has invested most of his savings in a very rare and valuable 
old car, a Bugatti, which he has not been able to insure. The Bugatti is his pride and joy. 
In addition to the pleasure he gets from driving and caring for his car, Bob knows that its 
rising market value means that he will always be able to sell it and live comfortably after 
retirement. One day when Bob is out for a drive, he parks the Bugatti near the end of a 
railway siding and goes for a walk up the track. As he does so, he sees that a runaway 
train, with no one aboard, is running down the railway track. Looking farther down the 
track, he sees the small figure of a child very likely to be killed by the runaway train. He 
can't stop the train and the child is too far away to warn of the danger, but he can throw a 
switch that will divert the train down the siding where his Bugatti is parked. Then nobody 
will be killed —but the train will destroy his Bugatti. Thinking of his joy in owning the 
car and the financial security it represents, Bob decides not to throw the switch. The child 
is killed. For many years to come, Bob enjoys owning his Bugatti and the financial 
security it represents. (Singer 2016, 38–40; Unger 1996, 135–36) 
The argument that Singer eventually develops is normally seen as a consistency-based 
argument – that if one believes Bob’s decision here was morally vile, one should (to be 
consistent) also think that refusing to donate to charity to save starving children is morally vile. 
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But, upon closer examination, the argument is more complex. Singer’s description of the 
vulnerable child on a railway track brings out the urgency of the matter and accentuates one’s 
anxiety and concern for the child’s life: “[Bob] sees the small figure of a child very likely to be 
killed by the runaway train” (Singer 2016, 39). Singer may intend for readers to draw 
interpretive and emotional associations between the imaginary child on the track and between 
suffering children in the real world. The force of this argument depends not only on its logical 
soundness, but on the associations the audience draws between saving a child’s life at the 
expense of a luxury car and saving many children from terrible life conditions at the expense of 
other luxuries. The analogy highlights certain similarities between the two cases: the urgency, 
the vulnerability of the children, and the grave potential consequences. A different scenario that 
appealed to consistency but did not highlight these similarities might be less persuasive. Vitally, 
analogical reasoning can work more directly on our motives than consistency-based reasoning 
typically does. In both the ox case and the Bugatti case, the argument begins with 
considerations for which the interlocutor already had strong emotional and motivational 
reactions. This is not merely an attempt at emotional appeal; these arguments aim to improve 
not just our moral beliefs but also our moral perspectives: how we perceive, interpret, 
understand, and react to (emotionally and motivationally) to certain circumstances. To 
genuinely instantiate moral progress via a moral perspective shift, patterns of reasoning beyond 
abstract consistency-based reasoning can be essential. Therefore, here is our second lesson for 
anti-realist accounts of moral progress: analogical reasoning is a powerful tool for moral 
progress - it can not only help us improve upon our moral beliefs, but it can also help us shift 
into better moral perspectives.	
4. Lesson Three: Moral Emotion-elicited Moral Progress 
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We now move to lesson three, according to which moral emotions, instead of mind-
independent moral facts, are main sources of moral progress. Of course, some realists would 
accept this claim too, if they believe that moral emotions can point to or make salient certain 
objective moral facts. Mengzi might believe something like this – but here we will focus on 
features of his view that are useful for anti-realists.8 Further, we should note that the role of 
emotions is especially important for a perspectival account of moral progress: emotions are, in 
part, salience and motivation generators (see Lance and Tanesini 2004), and part of what 
perspectives do is structure the salience of our beliefs and the urgency of our motivations (Camp 
2006; Riggs 2016). 
Against accounts like Campbell and Kumar’s, Kurth (2013, 2017) has argued that a 
consistency-based reasoning model fails to adequately explain certain paradigmatic cases of 
moral progress: cases where a person felt visceral moral anxiety at the prospect of some action, 
and thus came to believe that it was wrong. For example, the influential 17th century Quaker 
abolitionist John Woolman claimed that the key catalyst in his realizing the evils of slavery was 
that he suddenly felt “so afflicted in my mind” when he was asked to write a bill of sale for one 
of his employer’s slaves (this case is prominent in the anti-realist literature on moral progress; 
see Kitcher 2011, 158–61; Kurth 2017, 1–2). It therefore seems that some cases of moral 
progress are best understood not as a discovery of new mind-independent moral facts, but as a 
response to moral emotions prompted by certain situations. Similarly, Mengzi discusses how 
																																								 																				
8 Thanks to Colin Marshall for suggesting we note this. There are two main advantages (over similar realist 
accounts) for anti-realists / constructivists that ground moral progress in our emotions: first, their view (which does 
not posit objective moral facts) is more parsimonious (and perhaps less ontologically “weird,” see Mackie 1991), 
and second, they do not need to explain the sheer epistemic luck that would be required for our evolutionarily-
shaped emotions to track objective moral truth (see Street 2006; Vavova 2015). 
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moral emotions led people to realize that they must properly bury their dead parents’ bodies, 
instead of leaving them to be devoured by wild animals: 
Now, in past ages, there were those who did not bury their parents. When their parents 
died, they took them and abandoned them in a gulley.  They next day they passed by 
them, and foxes were eating them, bugs were sucking on them. Sweat broke out on the 
survivors’ foreheads. They turned away and did not look. It was not for the sake of others 
that they sweated. What was inside their hearts broke through to their countenances. So 
they went home and, returning with baskets and shovels, covered them. If covering them 
was really right, then the manner in which filial children and benevolent people cover 
their parents must also be part of the Way.” (Mengzi 3A5; emphasis added) 
The protagonist in the last part of this passage first abandoned his parents’ bodies in a gulley. No 
one instructed him about the rightness or wrongness of this action, but when he passed by the 
scene on the next day, he had a series of physiological and psychological responses such as 
sweat breaking out on his forehead and a compulsion to avoid directly looking at the scene. 
Mengzi further emphasizes, these responses are not for show, they come directly from the heart – 
meaning that these reactions are from innate emotions and not particular beliefs one may have 
acquired through learning.9  
Mengzi did not specify in the text exactly which emotion he is discussing here. Shame, 
compassion (for the parents), and deference are all good candidates. Some commentators argue 
that this passage is discussing the origin of rituals associated with the moral emotion of 
deference (Hansen 1992). One could also argue that Mengzi has in mind compassion which 
																																								 																				
9 The claim here is not that Mengzi thinks beliefs are unimportant or superfluous for moral change, but just that in 
this (and like) cases, the natural emotional reaction is the engine that drives changes in other mental states.  
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originates from filial love, especially since the passage ends with the claim that “filial children 
and benevolent people cover their parents” (3A5). Shame seems relevant too, since this passage 
deals with what is right and what is wrong, which is associated with the moral emotion of shame 
in Mengzi (Chong 2003), and since the phenomenology described matches the phenomenology 
of shame. The consensus is that Mengzi is discussing one of the four sprouts / beginnings here. 
Setting aside which emotions are involved in this case (though, we’ll return to the emotion of 
shame shortly), the general point is that leaving one’s parents’ corpses unburied brings out strong 
emotional reactions, which according to Mengzi not only compelled people into “returning with 
baskets and shovels, cover[ing] them” but also leads to the conclusion that burying one’s 
parents’ corpse is right, or part of the Way. 
Some anti-realists have argued that their accounts of moral progress are more 
descriptively accurate than moral realists’ accounts, that when we pay close attention to 
paradigmatic cases of personal moral progress, the changes do not appear to be discoveries about 
some mind-independent objective morality. Mengzi’s text provides an example of how moral 
progress can occur not through discovering mind-independent moral facts but through the 
emergence of moral emotions in particular situations. Mengzi is not the only philosopher who 
makes such a claim: sympathy, shame, and (as in Kurth) moral anxiety are each seen as causes of 
moral progress (in addition to Kurth 2013, see Boxill 1995; Jacquet 2016; Manion 2002; Appiah 
2011). To take a familiar example, consider Martin Luther King Jr.’s shaming of white 
moderates in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” where he suggests that  the “great stumbling 
block in the stride toward freedom is not the White Citizens Councillor or the Ku Klux Klanner 
but the white moderate who is more devoted to order than to justice” (King Jr. 1963). Since 
many would be ashamed to be considered worse than the Ku Klux Klan, by claiming that “white 
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moderates” were more problematic for black people than the Ku Klux Klan, King may have been 
(in part) attempting to shame certain people into moral progress and being more active in their 
support of civil rights. 
One may wonder: since shame is widely considered a destructive, burdening emotion that 
targets the most vulnerable individuals, should we rely on it to make moral progress? The Mengzian 
system offers some guidance on this point. First, Confucian shame is a foreword-looking emotion 
that focuses on preempting situations that violate one’s ethical standards. Hence, one often should 
not feel shame over violations of conventional standards, nor should one dwell on past experiences 
(Seok 2017; Shun 2013, 2015, 1997; Van Norden 2002).10 Second, many besides Mengzi recognize 
the importance of shame at the foundations of morality: recall Protagoras’s speech in Plato’s 
Protagoras, in which he claims that Zeus gave all human beings a sense of justice and of shame so 
that cities and societies could exist (Protagoras 320c-328d). C.C. Raymond has shown shame’s 
positive function in the work of Plato and Aristotle generally (Raymond, 2017; Raymond, 2013). 
That being said, shame and other moral emotions cannot be expected to produce adequate responses 
in all moral situations. Shame is only one of the four important moral emotions in Mengzi. The 
Mengzian system utilizes a multi-factor account of moral psychology which has a unique advantage 
in the interpretation of moral progress. One challenge for anti-realist accounts of moral progress 
that prioritize some highly particular function of morality, such as counteracting the negative 
consequences of our limited sympathies (see Mackie 1991, 107–111) or minimizing the damage 
from altruism failures (see Kitcher 2012), is that they seem overly narrow. Morality concerns issues 
of justice, truth-telling, loyalty, honor, respect, civility, and these do not neatly reduce down to one 
																																								 																				
10 Also, see Justin Tiwald (2017) for a thoughtful discussion on the relationship between the conventional standard 
and the personal ethical standard related to shame in the Confucian tradition. 
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narrow function. It is not hard to find counterexamples that are intuitively immoral but would not 
be treated as so on those fairly narrow accounts. 11  Kitcher, for example, faces potential 
counterexamples concerning, say, dictators minimizing conflict that could lead to altruism failures 
(on his view, an instance of moral progress) via brutal repression (see Kitcher 2011, 225–229). Now, 
whether Kitcher can accommodate such cases is an important question, but we should appreciate 
how Mengzi’s sprout system simply avoids the issue: it does not try to reduce morality to any one 
particular function or value. Thus, Mengzian-inspired anti-realist or constructivist accounts can 
explain cases that promote one value (e.g. compassion for some people’s material well-being) at 
the expense of another (e.g. a simultaneous affront to the dignity of other people). Various moral 
emotions, analogical reasoning, and consistency-based reasoning can all help explain cases of 
paradigmatic moral progress, without appeal to mind-independent moral facts. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have drawn three lessons from Mengzi on the metaethics of moral 
progress. The first and most general lesson was that it is possible to develop an account of moral 
progress not only in terms of improving moral beliefs but also in terms of improving moral 
perspectives. The second and third lessons provided Mengzian-inspired tools for developing such 
an account. The second lesson was that analogical reasoning could be utilized in accounts of anti-
realist or constructivist moral progress in addition to consistency-based reasoning. The third 
lesson was that a variety of moral emotions can be utilized in accounts of anti-realist or 
constructivist moral progress. These three lessons suggest numerous avenues for fruitful further 
exploration. First, and most generally, we have suggested here several interesting and important 
components for perspectival metaethical theories (and theories of moral progress) gleaned from 
																																								 																				
11 Thanks to William Talbott at the Lost Voices Conference for raising this concern. 
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the philosophical work of Mengzi. Second, though our focus here has been metaethical, there are 
useful lessons in practical ethics to be drawn from our discussion. Not only might Mengzi’s texts 
be mined for effective techniques of moral persuasion, they also problematize ingrained views 
about critical engagement that treat the only epistemically legitimate type of persuasion as based 
entirely on rational argument (anything else, we might think, is merely an “emotional appeal” or 
manipulation). Problematic non-belief components of a persons’ perspective might need to be 
adjusted using methods other than rational argument (such as analogical reasoning). Third, the 
perspectival ideas we’ve developed here might be useful in supplementing virtue ethical 
interpretations of early Confucianism and virtue ethical theories in general (see especially Hutton 
2002 and Ivanhoe 2011). Finally, our discussion in this chapter might suggest new avenues for 
constructivist interpretations of the early Confucians and especially for Mengzi, who is likely the 
major early Confucian philosopher least readily-interpreted as constructivist. 
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